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THE SIXTH CIRCUIT GRANTS THE FDIC PRIORITY OVER DIRECT
SHAREHOLDER SUITS AGAINST OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
OF BANKS IN FDIC RECEIVERSHIP
Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1990),
modified, 933 F.2d 400 (1991)
In Gaff v. FDIC,I the Sixth Circuit established a uniform federal com-
mon-law rule that grants the Federal Deposit Insurance Company
(FDIC) absolute priority over direct 2 shareholder claims against officers
and directors of banks in FDIC receivership.3
Joel Gaff brought a direct shareholder action4 against the officers and
directors of the National Bank of Traverse City in Michigan state court.'
Later, the bank became insolvent6 and the FDIC took control as re-
ceiver.7 After liquidating a portion of the bank's liabilities with its insur-
ance fund,' the FDIC sold the insolvent bank's assets and unliquidated
liabilities to a solvent national bank in a purchase and assumption agree-
ment.9 Under the agreement, the FDIC "bought back" the assets that
the purchasing bank did not desire.10 These assets included the insolvent
bank's claim against its former officers and directors." The FDIC main-
tained the claim through its corporate capacity for collection.' 2 Thus,
the FDIC obtained its claim against the bank's former officers and direc-
1. 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1990), modified, 933 F.2d 400 (1991).
2. A direct shareholder claim is an "[a]ction by a stockholder to enforce a right of action
existing in him as contrasted with a derivative suit in behalf of a corporation." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 459 (6th ed. 1990). See generally DEBORAH A. DEMoTr, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
ACTIONS § 2:01 (1987) (distinguishing derivative from direct shareholder actions). See infra note
31.
3. 919 F.2d at 387, 396.
4. Gaff also brought a derivative suit, which the FDIC moved to dismiss. Id. at 386. The
district court stayed Gaff's derivative claim until the FDIC resolved its claim. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 385. The bank became insolvent due to alleged fraud and mismanagement by the
bank's officers and directors. Id. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
7. 919 F.2d at 385. The FDIC took over the bank as receiver pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)
(1988), amended by 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c) (West 1989).
8 919 F.2d at 385. The FDIC insurance fund paid out approximately $47 million to deposi-
tors. Id. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of FDIC options in
receivership.
9. 919 F.2d at 385. See infra note 29 and accompanying text regarding purchase and assump-
tions agreements.
10. 919 F.2d at 386.
11. Id.
12, Id.
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tors after Gaff had fied his claim.1 3
The FDIC, acting in its corporate capacity, intervened in Gaff's suit
and removed the case to federal court."4 The District Court for the
Western District of Michigan dismissed Gaff's pendant claim with preju-
dice. 5 On appeal (Gaff!), the Sixth Circuit held that the district court
should not have exercised its pendant jurisdiction and, consequently,
should remand Gaff's direct claim to state court.16 On reconsideration
(Gaff I), the Sixth Circuit remanded Gaff's direct claim to the district
court, holding that the district court should exercise its discretion to
maintain pendant jurisdiction. "7 On remand, the district court dismissed
Gaff's direct claims due to an insufficient showing of direct injury.18 On
Gaff's second appeal (GaffII1), the Sixth Circuit assumed that Gaff had
suffered a direct injury, but nevertheless vacated and remanded the
case,'9 holding that the FDIC has an absolute priority over direct share-
holder claims against officers and directors of banks in FDIC
receivership. 20
Congress created the FDIC in 193321 in response to the virtual col-
13. Id.
14. Id. The FDIC had reached a settlement (contingent on this case) with the former officers
and directors that would have depleted most of the bank's insurance coverage. Id. See infra note
81.
15. 919 F.2d at 386.
16. 814 F.2d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 1987).
17. 828 F.2d 1145, 1150 (6th Cir. 1987).
18. 919 F.2d at 386.
19. Id. at 397. The Sixth Circuit instructed the district court to stay Gaff's direct claim until
the court resolved the FDIC claim against the officers and directors. The district court was then to
remand Gaff's claim to state court for adjudication on the merits. Id. This mirrored the district
court's previous ruling on Gaff's derivative claim. See supra note 4.
20. 919 F.2d at 387, 397. The Sixth Circuit's holding renders irrelevant the determination of
whether a shareholder's claim is direct or derivative. In the Sixth Circuit, the FDIC now has abso-
lute priority over both direct and derivative shareholder claims against officers and directors of
banks in FDIC receivership. See supra notes 4 and 19.
21. Congress created the FDIC in the Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 8(12B), 48
Stat 162. The FDIC was
established during the economic and banking crisis of the early 1930s when thousands of
banks were forced to close their doors. It was created to restore and reinforce public confi-
dence in the banking system, to promote safe and sound banking practices and the stability
of banks, to obviate runs on banks by depositors, to safeguard deposits through deposit
insurance, and to prevent the recurrence of the events of 1931 and 1932 which sapped
banking strength and climaxed in the "bank holiday" of March 1933.
John C. Platt & Ricki S. Darby, A Primer on the Special Rights and Immunities of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 11 OxLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 683, 683 n.1 (citing FDIC v. Allen, 584
F. Supp. 386, 397 (E.D. Tenn. 1984)). Congress created the federal deposit insurance program to
"end the destruction of the medium of exchange and to preserve the existing structure of the in-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss1/10
19921 FDIC PRIORITY OVER SHAREHOLDER SUITS
lapse of the national banking system during the Great Depression.22
More banks failed in the FDIC's first decade than in the four subsequent
decades combined.23 However, in the second half of the 1980s, the
number of bank failures steadily increased, setting post-depression
records.24 Nonfeasance, misfeasance, and malfeasance of bank officers
and directors greatly contributed to this increase.25
Congress organized the FDIC so that its main component is the de-
posit insurance program, which insures bank depositors against potential
losses from bank failures.26 When the FDIC takes receivership of an
insolvent bank, it has two basic options to cover depositors' insured ac-
counts.27 It may perform a straight liquidation 8 and/or execute a
purchase and assumption agreement.29 Both options provide the FDIC
dependent unit banks." STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISION,
REGULATION AND INSURANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AF-
FAIRS, 101ST CONG., 2D SESs., A BRIEFING PAPER ON DEPOSIT INSURANCE: How IT
ORIGINATED AND How IT WORKS 34, 35 (Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter BRIEFING PAPER].
22. Platt & Darby, supra note 21, at 683. See also BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 21; KENNETH
SPONG, BANKING REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES, IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECT'S 13-25 (1985).
23. Platt & Darby, supra note 21, at 683-84. In the first decade 490 banks failed. Only 317
failed during the next four decades. Id. See also FDIC, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 100-01 (1990)
[hereinafter FDIC ANNUAL REPORT]. The House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions con-
cluded that 495 banks failed from 1934 to 1943. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 21, at 48. Of those,
283 were insured. PHILIP F. BARTHOLOMEW, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REFORMING
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 142-43 (1990).
24. Platt & Darby, supra note 21, at 684. In the 1970s only 81 banks failed. In the mid-1980s
the number of bank failures rose dramatically. FDIC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 101
(1984: 79; 1985: 120; 1986: 138; 1987: 184; 1988: 200; 1989: 206).
25. Carol Galbraith & Joseph Seidel, FDIC vs. Imprudent Banking Official: The Enforcement
Apparatus, 104 BANKING L.J. 92 (1987). Some analysts consider fraud the most important risk
depositories face. BARTHOLOMEW, supra note 23, at 70 (citing George J. Benston & George G.
Kaufman, Risk and Failures in Banking: Overview, History and Evaluation, in DEREGULATING
FINANCIAL SERVICES: PUBLIC POLICY IN FLUX 52 (G. Kaufman & R. Kormendi eds., 1986)).
Insider abuse or criminal fraud was present in approximately one quarter of 1989's bank failures.
FDIC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 16.
26. FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1539 (11th Cir. 1989); 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (1988).
27. Gunther v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
These basic options are not mutually exclusive. Platt & Darby, supra note 21, at 687 n.16. The
FDIC combined its two options in Gaff. 919 F.2d at 385. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying
text. See also BARTHOLOMEW, supra note 23, at 63-67.
28. Guntner, 674 F.2d at 865. The FDIC liquidates a bank by making payments that cover
depositors' accounts up to the statutory insurance limit. The sale of the bank's assets funds the
liquidation with the FDIC's insurance fund making up any shortfall. This method has several disad-
vantages: first, a bank's closing negatively affects public confidence in the banking system; second,
liquidation delays the paying of insured amounts to depositors; and third, the possibility exists that
depositors could lose uninsured funds. Id.
29. Id. In a purchase and assumption agreement, the FDIC, in its capacity as receiver, sells the
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the requisite standing to sue the insolvent bank's former officers and di-
rectors.30 Accordingly, the FDIC frequently will have claims that com-
pete with those of the bank's shareholders."
Congress debated whether to give the FDIC priority over direct share-
holder claims when it discussed and passed the Financial Institutions Re-
form, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).32 The Senate
Judiciary Committee rejected an amendment to FIRREA3 3 that ex-
pressly would have given the FDIC absolute priority over shareholders
in claims against bank officers and directors.34 The joint conference re-
port, which called the provision "fundamentally unsound as a policy
matter," indicated several concerns with the provision.3" According to
the report, the Senate amendment would have hindered fraud enforce-
ment efforts, 36 been unjust to innocent plaintiffs, 37 and conflicted with
assets and liabilities to a solvent bank, which then reopens the failed bank. The FDIC receiver next
"buys back" any doubtful assets that the solvent bank does not desire, such as the original bank's
cause of action against former bank officers and directors. The FDIC, in its corporate capacity, then
attempts to collect these doubtful assets. In this preferred option the depositors get continued ser-
vice, the FDIC incurs fewer expenses, and the purchasing bank receives a new low-risk investment.
Id.; Platt & Darby, supra note 21, at 692. Therefore, the FDIC usually employs this option. Id. In
1988, the FDIC used purchase and assumption agreements in 82% of its bank-failure transactions;
in 1989, the FDIC employed such agreements in 84% of bank-failure transactions. FDIC ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 23, at 12.
30. Galbraith & Seidel, supra note 25, at 95.
31. The circuit courts agree that the FDIC has absolute priority over shareholders' derivative
claims against officers and directors of banks in FDIC receivership. Because of this, the courts
dedicate most of their opinions to the distinction between derivative and direct actions. See, e.g., In
re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 916 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1990); Howard v. Haddad, 916 F.2d 167, 168-69 (4th
Cir. 1990); FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1541-42 (11th Cir. 1989). When a corporation fails to
pursue a cause of action it possesses, a shareholder may bring a derivative suit on the corporation's
behalf. DEMoTr, supra note 2. In a derivative lawsuit every shareholder's injury is identical and
proportionate to her ownership interest. Id. When the FDIC obtains a bank's cause of action
against officers and directors and decides to pursue the claim, a derivative shareholder's claim is
subsumed within the FDIC's claim. 916 F.2d at 889. See supra note 2. In Gaff, the Sixth Circuit
addressed whether the FDIC has an absolute priority over a shareholder's direct claims.
32. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L.
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183; FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1538 n.1 (11th Cir. 1989). FIRREA
constitutes the most important restructuring of the federal deposit insurance system in over 50 years.
It increased the scope of both the FDIC's receivership authority and enforcement powers. Daniel B.
Gail & Joseph J. Norton, The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989:
Dealing with the Regulators, 107 BANKING L.J. 196 (1990).
33. S. 774, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 214(o) (1989).
34. 135 CONG. Rac. H4989 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Rep. Staggers).
35. Id. at H4985 (statement of Rep. Glickman).
36. Id. at H4989 (statement of Rep. Staggers). Private parties would stop bringing suits against
officers and directors whose fraud was responsible for the bank's failure. These private actions are
necessary for effective enforcement, since the Department of Justice does not have the resources to
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss1/10
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the underlying purposes of the savings and loan legislation."8
The circuit courts disagree as to how much weight they should give
this legislative history. In FDIC v. Jenkins,39 the Eleventh Circuit re-
fused to create a uniform federal common-law rule that would give the
FDIC absolute priority over direct shareholder claims.' The FDIC had
moved to stay several shareholders' direct claims against an insolvent
bank's officers and directors until the FDIC resolved its competing
claim.4 The district court granted the FDIC's motion for summary
judgment and the shareholders appealed.4 2 The Eleventh Circuit, how-
ever, after analyzing the case law, did not find any authority to support
the FDIC's argument that it had absolute priority over other claims.43
The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Langley v. FDIC,'4
and refused to "engraft an equitable exception upon the plain terms of
the statute."45 Instead, the court examined the FDIC's need for a uni-
form federal common-law rule by applying the three criteria the Supreme
Court developed in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. 46
In Kimbell Foods, the Supreme Court held that before a court estab-
lishes a uniform federal common-law rule it must consider: (1) whether
the federal program by its nature must have national uniformity; (2)
whether application of individual state's laws would interfere with the
federal program's specific objectives; and (3) the degree to which applica-
tion of a uniform federal common-law rule would disrupt commercial
enforce the law on its own. Id. The SEC reported that an absolute FDIC priority would "have a
serious adverse impact on enforcement efforts" and actually would encourage fraud. Id. at H4985
(statement of Rep. Glickman).
37. Id. at H4989 (statement of Rep. Staggers). It is unfair to allow the FDIC to intervene and
stay a private plaintiff's case at any stage of litigation, especially if the private plaintiff has invested
time and resources in the case. Id.
38. Id. There is no evidence that FDIC priority would benefit taxpayers, especially with the
increased chance of fraud by officers and directors. Id. See supra note 36. Such a provision would
be a disincentive to investors since they would have no recourse against fraudulent inducement to
invest. 135 CONG. REc. H4989 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Rep. Staggers). Moreover, the
FDIC netted only five million dollars in 1987 from bank-related defendants. Id. See also FDIC v.
Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1540 n.5 (I Ith Cir. 1989).
39. 888 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989).
40. Id. at 1544-46.
41. Id. at 1538-39.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1543. Several cases had addressed the issue, but the court found none dispositive.
Id.
44. 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
45. 888 F.2d at 1544.
46. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
1992]
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relationships grounded in state law.4 7 In addition, the Court stated that
courts developing a uniform federal common law should effectuate con-
gressional policy by filling in statutory gaps that Congress has left.4"
The Jenkins court held that the FDIC's structure did not meet the
Kimbell Foods criteria. 9 It found that the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act did not compel the FDIC to pursue claims against third parties to
restore the deposit insurance fund.50 Moreover, the court concluded that
the FDIC did not have sufficient need to establish a uniform common-
law rule." In addition, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Act's legisla-
tive history clearly showed that Congress did not intend to grant the
FDIC such a priority.52
In Howard v. Haddad,3 the Fourth Circuit expressly followed Jen-
kins." A shareholder sued an insolvent bank's directors for securities
fraud, alleging that the directors misrepresented the bank's condition to
secure a stock purchase.5 The FDIC attempted to dismiss the share-
holder's claim.56 The court held that because the action arose from the
stock's sale to the individual shareholder, and not from diminution of the
stock's value, the claim was direct, not derivative.57 Expressly adopting
the Jenkins holding, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the FDIC does
not have an absolute priority over direct shareholder claims against di-
rectors of banks in FDIC receivership."
In In Re Sunrise Securities Litigation, the Third Circuit approved of
Jenkins and its reliance on legislative history.' Depositors sued the of-
47. Id. at 728-29.
48. Id. at 738.
49. 888 F.2d at 1546. But see Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1990), modified, 933 F.2d
400 (1991) (FDIC meets the requirements of Kimbell Foods).
50. 888 F.2d at 1546.
51. Id. The court stated that while "it would be convenient to the FDIC to have an arsenal of
priorities... to maximize recovery to the insurance fund .... this does not require that courts must
grant... these tools.... Any rule fashioned must have its base on the goal of effectuating congres-
sional policy." Id.
52. The Jenkins court relied heavily on legislative history when it decided not to grant the
FDIC an absolute priority. Id. at 1538 n.l. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
53. 916 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1990).
54. Id. at 170.
55. Id. at 168-69.
56. Id. at 169.
57. Id. at 171.
58. Id. at 170.
59. 916 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1990).
60. Id. at 876.
[Vol. 70:255
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ficers, directors, attorneys, and auditors of a failed savings and loan, al-
leging, inter alia, violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act.61 The court held that the claims were derivative, and
therefore, Jenkins did not apply.62 However, the court stated in dicta
that the FDIC would not have absolute priority over direct claims. 6 A
district court in the Third Circuit subsequently has followed the Sunrise
Litigation dicta and denied the Resolution Trust Corporation's (RTC)
motion to stay a direct shareholder action.6
In Gaff v. FDIC,65 the Sixth Circuit split from the Third, Fourth, and
Eleventh Circuits by granting the FDIC absolute priority over direct
shareholder claims against officers and directors of banks in FDIC re-
ceivership. 66 The court expressly rejected the Jenkins interpretation of
the relevant legislative history.67 The Sixth Circuit noted the legislative
history's silence as to why Congress excluded the proposal to give the
FDIC priority.68 The Gaff court interpreted this silence as indicating
that Congress intended the federal courts to establish the law of priorities
on a case-by-case basis.69
The Gaff court first determined that federal law governed FDIC pri-
orities.70 Next, the court examined the FDIC's need for a uniform fed-
eral common-law rule of priorities and concluded that the FDIC met the
61. Id.; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
62. 916 F.2d at 889. See supra notes 2, 31 and accompanying text.
63. 916 F.2d at 889. The court stated that, "[to the extent... depositors assert individual,
nonderivative fraud claims against the officers, directors, auditors, or attorneys of insolvent financial
institutions, they may proceed on equal footing with FDIC." Id.
64. In re Atlantic Fin. Fed. Sec. Litig., No. 89-0645, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7439 (E.D. Pa.
May 28, 1991). Shareholders sued the officers and directors of a bank in RTC receivership for
negligent misrepresentation. The RTC moved to stay the shareholders' suit until the court resolved
the RTC claim against the officers and directors. The district court held the shareholders' claim to
be direct. The court then followed the Sunrise Litigation dicta and denied the stay. Id. This case is
relevant in that the RTC and the FDIC have the same powers and rights. Id. at *4 n.2; 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1441a(bX4) (West Supp. 1991).
65. 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1990), modified, 933 F.2d 400 (1991).
66. Id. at 396.
67. Id. See supra notes 33-38, 52 and accompanying text.
68. 919 F.2d at 396.
69. Id. However, Representative Harley Staggers, Jr. (D-W.Va.) charged that the FDIC "seri-
ously misrepresented" congressional intent and claimed that the FDIC was "trying to rewrite the
legislative history of FIRREA." Congressman Says FDIC Misled Court; Staggers Blasts FDIC Over
Priority Issue, 54 BNA's BANKING REPORT 446 (Mar. 12, 1990). Rep. Staggers "blasted" the
FDIC, saying that Congress had debated and specifically rejected an FDIC priority. Id. (citing a
letter from Rep. Staggers to FDIC Director L. William Seidman).
70. 919 F.2d at 388. No one disputes federal law's application. United States v. Kimbell
Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979); FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1545 n.14 (11th Cir. 1989).
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three Kimbell Foods criteria.71 First, the bank insurance system requires
national uniformity.72 The FDIC is unprepared to apply various state
priority laws to its transactions. The agency is under severe time con-
straints when it closes a bank and the various state-law defenses would
hinder a rapid closing between liquidation and purchase and assump-
tion.73 Second, the bank insurance program could not meet its objective
of providing a strong national bank system that promotes public confi-
dence if individual state laws could interfere with the FDIC's priority
over shareholder claims.74 Third, a uniform federal rule would not dis-
rupt commercial expectations based on individual state laws because the
possibility of bank failure does not affect those expectations signifi-
cantly.75 Bank shareholders' expectations revolve around the deposits
received and loans made, not around any future rights they may have to
sue directors and officers for mismanagement and fraud.76
After determining the need for a uniform federal priority rule under
Kimbell Foods, the Gaff court addressed that rule's substantive require-
ments. 77 The court analogized the FDIC's need for priorities to the ex-
isting priorities found in both corporate dissolution law78 and bankruptcy
law.7 9 In both, equitable subordination places the shareholders last in
the priority line.80 The Gaff court incorporated this concept and estab-
lished a federal common-law rule that grants the FDIC absolute priority
over shareholders' direct claims against officers and directors of banks in
FDIC receivership.81
Rather, the issue is whether the federal law should be uniform in nature, excluding state law, or
whether it should incorporate state commercial law. 919 F.2d at 387.
71. 919 F.2d at 388-90. But see Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1545-46 (FDIC does not meet the Kimbell
Foods requirements). See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
72. 919 F.2d at 388-89.
73. Id. at 389.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 389-90.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 391-96.
78. Id. at 392-93.
79. Id. at 393-94.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 394. The Sixth Circuit has modified the Gaff decision and now allows district courts
to lift an FDIC stay on direct shareholder actions to decide their legal sufficiency when doing so will
facilitate settlement. Gaff v. VDIC, 933 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1991). This will benefit the FDIC. With-
out such a modification, officers and directors may be unwilling to settle with the FDIC since they
would not know whether to reserve a portion of the insurance to cover possible shareholder claims.
FDIC Priority Over Shareholder Claims Revised, 56 BNA's BANKING REPORT 1210 (June 24, 1991).
See supra note 14.
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The Sixth Circuit's creation of an absolute FDIC priority is incorrect
for several reasons. First, the court usurped Congress' function. Courts
may create uniform federal common law to fill legislative gaps, while
effectuating legislative intent.12 In the situation that the Gaff court ad-
dressed, however, no gap existed because Congress had expressly rejected
such a priority." Furthermore, a court should not eliminate lightly an
individual's right to redress in court. Such elimination should require
legislative action or a court ruling based on clear legislative intent.
Neither existed here.
Second, the analogies the Sixth Circuit drew between the FDIC's need
for priorities and corporate dissolution and bankruptcy law are weak. 4
The analogies stand only if the shareholders' claim is derivative. First,
unlike the risk of an enterprise failing, a direct shareholder suit against
the directors and officers implies a wrong done to the shareholder indi-
vidually, not as member of a group. 5 Second, in a direct action the
shareholder sues bank-related third parties (the bank's directors and of-
ficers), rather than the bank, in an attempt to secure a place in line for
distribution of the failed bank's director and officer insurance proceeds or
the directors' and officers' personal assets.86 Due to the inherent differ-
ences between direct and derivative shareholder claims, the analogies
crumble when shareholders have direct claims against bank-related third
parties, as was the case in Gaff.
Finally, the Gaff decision promotes counterproductive policies. Share-
holders and depositors will no longer pursue direct legal claims against
corrupt officers and directors, since they know the FDIC's interference
will render both their time and resources meaningless.8 7 Consequently,
this will hinder the prosecution of fraudulent behavior by officers and
directors, which will, in turn, increase the likelihood of such fraud and
the cost to taxpayers.88
82. See supra text accompanying note 48.
83. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
84. The court stated, "[a]s a general rule of equity, stockholders take last in the estate of a
bankrupt corporation. Because, unlike creditors and depositors, stockholders stand to gain a share
of corporate profits, stockholders should take the primary risk of the enterprise failing." 919 F.2d at
392 (emphasis added). See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
85. In re Atlantic Fin. Fed. Sec. Litig., No. 89-0645, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7439, at *5-6
(E.D. Pa. May 28, 1991).
86. Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1545.
87. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 36, 38 and accompanying text.
1992]
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The Gaff decision is an unfortunate judicial expansion of FDIC pow-
ers at the expense of individuals' rights to pursue legal claims. Courts
should not sacrifice shareholders' rights to pursue direct claims against
third parties to achieve FDIC policies unless Congress explicitly so
mandates.
Christopher A. Martin
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss1/10
